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A Covert Channel Over Transport Layer Source Ports
James R. F. Gimbi, Daryl Johnson, Peter Lutz, Bo Yuan
B. Thomas Golisano College of Computing & Information Sciences
Rochester Institute of Technology, Rochester, NY, USA

Abstract – Covert communication is a rapidly expanding field
of research with significant impact on the security theater.
These communication methods, or “covert channels”, can be
applied in a number of ways, including as a mechanism for an
attacker to leak data from a monitored system or network.
This paper sets out to contribute to this field by introducing a
new covert channel which operates over transport layer
protocols. The mechanism is flexible, covert, and has the
potential to operate at relatively high bandwidth. In addition,
this paper proposes a number of encoding schemes which can
be used in conjunction with this channel to improve its
bandwidth and covertness.
Keywords: Network Covert Channels, Information Hiding,
Network Security
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Introduction

A covert channel can be defined as any communication
method where both the data being transmitted and the
existence of the channel itself are hidden from network and
system authority figures. The field has generated much
interest because of its applications on both sides of the
information security industry; while covert channels are useful
for defensive security applications and collaboration between
legitimate security teams, they can also be used by attackers to
covertly leak data from a secure environment.
This paper presents a novel method for leveraging
transport layer source ports as a medium for covert
communication. The technique is flexible and can be applied
in a wide variety of environments. The paper then discusses a
number of possible implementations of this channel. It will
also introduce a collection of encoding mechanisms to use in
conjunction with the channel and will review their utility.
Some of these encoding techniques provide data integrity and
obfuscate the channel from a would-be investigator.
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Related Work

Covert channels have been the subject of research for
some time. They were originally defined in [1] as any
communication medium not designed or intended for data
transfer but could be used as such. Multiple types of covert
channels have been defined, including storage channels,
timing channels and behavioral channels. This topic was
explored in depth in [2]. A storage channel is essentially any
channel where a shared storage medium is used to encode and

transmit information. A timing channel is any communication
which relies on the time between particular events to encode
and transmit information, instead of shared storage media.
Behavioral channels are broadly defined as any channel where
the mechanism is non-stored and time independent.
The channels covered in [1] are exclusively single
system process-to-process examples. Since then, the definition
of a covert channel has gradually expanded to include
channels between processes on two separate machines over a
computer network. [3] provided solid groundwork for creating
TCP/IP timing channels. The approach encoded data in the
amount of time between to the arrival of two packets. TCP/IP
storage channels were thoroughly examined in [4]. In this
work, data is transmitted in header fields of TCP/IP packets.
Two known works have identified transport layer source ports
as a potential channel medium in passing but did not discuss
how it might be accomplished [5] [6].

3

Covert Channel Over Source Ports

This section defines and outlines a method for using
transport layer source ports as a covert channel. A technical
background will be provided in subsection 3.1. The method
itself is introduced in 3.2. The final subsection will propose a
number of different technical implementations.

3.1

Technical Background

Communication between two computers over modern
network protocols requires the use of what is known as a
network socket. A socket is a tuple of data used to identify
each unique and active connection on a particular machine,
and a socket pair is a tuple containing information for both the
local and remote sockets [7]. While the exact contents of this
tuple will vary depending on which transport protocol is being
used, the TCP socket pair includes the IP addresses of both
machines as well as the port numbers each machine has
committed to the session. The IP addresses help the computer
keep track of which remote machine it is communication with,
while the port numbers help keep track of individual sessions
for that machine. This 4-tuple allows two computers to
manage thousands of unique conversations between them
without risk of data loss on any one session. For example, a
web client can make two distinct GET requests to a particular
the web server for different page elements at port 80. Because
they are two separate requests, different source port numbers
are selected by the client (i.e. port 1,111 for one socket pair,
and port 2,222 for the second socket pair) so the server knows
which remote socket to feed the appropriate HTML response.

While most services are given a dedicated port number
with which to manage all connections, client ports are not
static and will not always be the same under normal
operation. Instead, the source port is generally a pseudorandom number selected from a given range. Ports selected
like this are known as ephemeral or temporary ports. This
gives the client operating system flexibility when establishing
new connections. There is technically nothing to prevent a
client from using any port within the 16 bit port range (ports 0
through 65,535) but there are suggested standard ranges
which most transport layer protocol implementations observe.
A commonly observed range is maintained by the Internet
Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) which mandates that
the two most significant bits must be registered as ones,
giving a usable ephemeral range of 49,152 through 65,535 for
a total of 16,384 available ports [8]. While Microsoft
operating systems now follow the recommended IANA range,
legacy Microsoft systems, such as Windows XP and 2000,
use the range 1,025 through 5,000 for a total of 3,976
available ports [9]. Linux systems tend to vary from
distribution to distribution but most use either the IANA
mandate or the range 32,768 through 61,000 for a total of
28,233 available ports.

3.2

Transport Layer Covert Channel

The following method takes advantage of the flexibility
provided by layer four protocols in source port selection and
can be applied to any type of network environment that uses a
layer four protocol, such as TCP and UDP. It consists of a
sender, which will transmit data over the channel, and a
receiver, which will collects the transmitted data. The sender
and receiver must be able to communicate in some legitimate
fashion without being flagged by a security appliance. For
example, this pair might be a web server and client (TCP), a
streaming media server and client (UDP), or some proprietary
protocol.
Each time a new source port is needed there is an
opportunity to transmit up to sixteen bits of information from
the client to the server in that source port field. A one-way
channel is established when a user or process manipulates the
source port to send data. Because all that is modified for this
channel is the contents of a mandatory static length field, it
can easily be piggybacked on top of legitimate traffic. The
channel lends itself to a large number of different encoding
mechanisms, two of which will be outlined in the next section.
While it is possible to use these bits to transmit
absolute data (i.e. sending an ASCII ‘A’ by using port 65), the
channel is made more covert and robust by using the delta
between two consecutive source ports. Using a delta scheme,
no data is actually stored in a given source port; an analyst
could investigate the totality of a guilty packet and find no
leaked data. By contrast, absolute data transmission can easily
be detected by an analyst reviewing a packet. Further, delta
schemes lower the likelihood of colliding consecutive source
ports because repeated characters will not use the same port
number. These collisions could cause problems if the channel
is run over legitimate traffic [10].

Bandwidth for this channel might appear to be limited
because of the tendency of most transport layer protocols,
particularly TCP, to use one socket per session. However, it is
not atypical for multiple sessions to be generated per task. For
example, when a typical web browser retrieves the HTML
document, style sheet, images and other elements from a
single web page it will frequently establish several sessions
with the remote server so that it can make many requests at a
time, enhancing protocol performance. Each of those requests
uses a different ephemeral source port, meaning that simply
accessing a lone web site with many elements can provide
adequate cover for this channel at high bandwidths. Similarly,
any protocol that takes advantage of parallel network sessions
could support high bandwidths with this channel.
If the sender and receiver communicate on a regular
basis the channel does not need to generate any new traffic. If
they do not normally communicate, there is much flexibility
in the traffic that can be used because of the applicationneutral nature of the channel. Virtually any protocol can be
selected for packet generation. This makes the channel simple
to customize for any number of environments without raising
the suspicions of common security appliances or analysts.
The channel does have a number of inherent
weaknesses. For instance, the prolific use of network address
translation technology (NAT) stands to limit the utility of the
channel as described. This is because many NAT
implementations modify the socket pair so that the source port
received by the receiver cannot be reliably controlled. As
such, if the sender lays behind a NAT box this channel is
limited to communicating with other machines behind the
NAT box. Similarly, proxy servers typically change the socket
pair, again limiting the applicable scope of the channel.
Sometimes the use of proxy servers is enforced even within a
LAN, potentially crippling the channel. Legitimate traffic
from the sender can possibly interfere with the channel in two
separate ways. First, if another unrelated process makes use of
an ephemeral port, that port will be locked from other
processes until the TIME_WAIT timer expires. This timer,
built into TCP with RFC793, is designed to ensure that the
socket can still properly handle traffic arriving late from a
closed connection [10]. If the source port required for the next
data transmission is still in TIME_WAIT, a poorly written or
light implementation might crash. While it is possible to work
around this issue, higher level permissions are generally
required. Second, if the sender and receiver communicate for
some legitimate reason outside of the channel process it is
possible that the receiver misinterprets the source port used in
that exchange as part of the message, corrupting the data and
calling to question the integrity of data received over this
channel. This last problem can be effectively eliminated by
using a robust encoding mechanism like the one discussed in
subsection 4.2.

3.3

Potential Implementations

This method can be implemented in any number of
ways ranging from the very clumsy to the very elegant. A
simple implementation might generate false traffic with no

real purpose other than providing a medium for the channel.
Such an implementation would have high bandwidth but
would be easy to identify as it would carry no changing data
except for the source port. A more sophisticated version might
act as a local wrapper for applications to use which would
replace source port addresses for packets it receives and map
it back to the original address, not unlike the basic
functionality of NAT. Legitimate client applications could be
a modified to take advantage of the channel. For example, a
web browser can be modified to use the proper ephemeral port
unless it is communicating with the intended receiving server,
in which case it would use encoded delta ports instead of
standard ephemeral ports.
A much more elegant approach than these might
include a kernel level modification on the sender. For
instance, every time any application communicates with the
intended receiver, the sender kernel selects encoded delta
ports. An implementation like this would eliminate the need to
manage redundancy checking (discussed in section 4.2),
greatly improving bandwidth while only using legitimate user
traffic to transmit data.

4
4.1

Encoding Mechanisms

used was 65,500 ( ) and the next value to be transmitted is
65 (V), it is clear that the port number is going to need to loop
as the port 65,565 is beyond the upper limit. The difference of
the 65,535 (
) and the last port used should be subtracted
from the value to be transmitted. The sum of that difference
and 49,152 (
minus 1 is the next port to be used. In this
case, the next port would be 49,181 ( ).
(

Table 1: Basic 8-bit Encoding of “ABC”
Port
50,000
50,065
50,131
50,198

Binary Representation
1100 0011 0101 0000
1100 0011 1001 0001
1100 0011 1101 0011
1100 0100 0001 0110

As mentioned above, IANA recommends that the first
two bits be set to one for ephemeral ports and, although the
range is not a technical limit, traffic coming from any port not
adhering to this rule may trigger a signature in an intrusion
detection system or fail to pass through an internal firewall
[11]. For that reason this encoding scheme should comply
with IANA recommendations, giving the scheme a port range
between 49,152 and 65,535. Once the upper limit of this range
has been reached, the numbers can loop around to the bottom
range picking up where they left off. This function is
described in Equation 1 where
and
are the range
limits, V is the value to be transmitted,
is the current port
and
is the next port to be used. For example, if the last port

)

(1)

This encoding scheme is somewhat inefficient. The
problem is that no more than eight of the sixteen bits are ever
being used at a time as the difference will never exceed 256.
To increase efficiency while staying within the guidelines set
forward by IANA, twelve or fourteen bits could be used on a
rolling basis. Table 2 illustrates how a twelve bit
implementation might encode the ASCII message “ABC”.
Note that the first four bits, shown in italics, are ignored. The
remaining bits are concatenated with the other port bits and
interpreted as a single binary string. A twelve bit encoding
mechanism such as this would enjoy 50% better throughput
that the eight bit counterpart outlined earlier, and a 14
fourteen bit representation would have 75% better throughput.
Table 2: Basic 12-bit Encoding of “ABC”

Simple Encoding Schemes

One example of a simple delta encoding scheme for
this channel is to use the difference between two raw
consecutive port numbers as the value to be transmitted. For
example, if a user wanted to transmit the message “ABC”
over the channel, they might first start a session with the
source port 50,000, followed by 50,065, then 50,131, and
finally 50,198. The differences between each port are 65, 66,
and 67 respectively, which are the values of the ASCII
decimal representations of the above message. This is
represented visually in table 1 where the non-italicized bits
carry the encoded data.

(

Port
49,156
49,539
52,320

Binary Representation
1100 0000 0000 0100
1100 0001 1000 0011
1100 1100 0110 0000

In some cases an implementation might not need to
worry about the IANA port standard and would be free to use
all sixteen bits. It may seem logical to simply divide the port
bits in half and use the difference between them, but this
method would forfeit the major benefit of delta encoding
because the data would be completely contained in a single
port number, making it easier for an analyst or security
appliance to identify the channel and discover the data being
transmitted. If a full sixteen bit scheme is selected, a better
solution would be to use the delta between the first byte from
two ports, followed by the delta between the first byte from
the second port and the second byte of the first port. Finally,
the delta between the second byte of the first port and the
second byte of the second port is considered. At that point the
pattern can be reversed and the cycle can continue. This is
demonstrated in table 3.
Table 3: Simple 16-bit Encoding of “ABC”
Port
131
19,654

4.2

Binary Representation
0000 0000 1000 0011
0100 1100 1100 0110

Advanced Encoding Schemes

While functional, the above basic encoding methods
can be problematic. The first major issue with these schemes,
especially the eight bit scheme in particular, is that they are

easy to identify. Second, they are all prone to data corruption.
As discussed above, there is a risk that legitimate, unrelated
communication between the sender and received could
interfere with the channel by using source port numbers
within the next delta range. There are 16,384 available
ephemeral ports in the IANA suggested range, meaning the
above eight bit implementation of the channel could be
disrupted by an ephemeral selection of anywhere between 256
and 512 ports. This translates to a chance of data corruption
between 1.56% and 3.13% for every unrelated source port
number. While some practical implementations might be
willing to call this acceptable loss in exchange for simplicity
and bandwidth, there may be cases where a more robust
approach is needed. In these cases improvements can be made
to the encoding mechanism. One such improvement is defined
below.
This more advanced encoding method uses the
available bits left over from the data encoding scheme to help
verify the contents of the next packet. In the previously
discussed eight-bit scheme there remain eight bits in the
sixteen bit port number which is further cut to six bits due to
the IANA ephemeral port definition discussed above. The
ones in the following bit string represent the bits in question:
0011 1111 0000 0000.
These bits will be used as a redundancy check (RC) to
verify that the next source port received is, indeed, part of the
message. To achieve this, an “exclusive or” (XOR) operation
is run between the data bits of the current source port and the
data bits of the previous source port. The resulting bit string is
truncated to fit the available RC bits, depending on
implementation. This method leaves the very first source port
in the chain without data to XOR. To address this problem,
both machines will share a key the same length as the RC bits.
The RC bits in the first source port sent will be the result of an
XOR between that key and the data bits to be transmitted.
When these port numbers are considered in context, it is very
easy to identify and ignore ports that are not a part of the
message, greatly increasing data integrity. This process is
illustrated in figure 1 and an 8 bit example is given in table 4.
Note that the two leading IANA bits are in italics and ignored.
The six bold bits for a given port are the result of an XOR
operation between the data bits in that port and the data bits of
the previous port or the initialization key.
Table 4: Advanced 8-bit Encoding of "ABC"
Port
Key
49,643
50,478
57,201

Binary Representation
10101010
11 000001 11101011
11 000101 00101110
11 011111 01110001

Figure 1: Advanced Encoding Process
This method allows only two bits worth of remaining
offending ephemeral ports, or four ports total. This lowers the
chance of data corruption to 0.02%. It should also be noted
that this modified encoding scheme has the additional
advantage of being more difficult for an analyst or security
appliance to detect as it maintains the advantage of being
present only in the delta while making the delta harder to
discover and making the raw source ports jump around.
Once again, this encoding scheme stands functional but
imperfect. If an implementation has no need to adhere to the
IANA port standard, a much improved scheme can be
developed. While maintaining eight data bits a full set of eight
RC bits could be committed to the channel, leaving no chance
of data corruption by unrelated traffic due to a perfect XOR. If
the next legitimate port happens to be selected by an unrelated
program, the real source port would be ignored due to
incorrect RC bits, leaving no corruption. An example of this
can be seen in table 5.
Table 5: Advanced 8-bit Encoding of "ABC"; not IANA
Compliant
Port
Key
16,875
50,478
24,433

Binary Representation
10101010
01000001 11101011
11000101 00101110
01011111 01110001

Even if IANA standards must be adhered to, an
improved implementation is possible with an encoding
implementation which uses seven data bits instead of eight.
There would be seven RC bits remaining to ensure integrity,
leaving no chance of data corruption by unrelated traffic for
the same reason outlined above. An example of this can be
seen in table 6.
Table 6: Advanced 7-bit Encoding of "ABC"
Port
Key
61,429
57,163
49,870
61,200

Binary Representation
10101010
11 1011111 1110101
11 0111110 1001011
11 0000101 1001110
11 1011110 0010000
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Conclusion and Future Work

This work presented a new method for leveraging
transport layer source ports as a covert channel. A number of
implementation models were discussed, including an efficient
and covert kernel modification. Additionally, a wide variety
of encoding schemes were proposed and reviewed on their
merit. These contributions open the door to a number of new
methods that warrant further work.
One method that may be worth exploring for future
work is a channel which duplicates regular network traffic
while changing the source port in the duplicate packet. Instead
of using live packets as the medium for the channel, a local
listener on the sender could wait for outgoing traffic destined
for the receiver. Once the traffic is identified, the sender will
create duplicate packets of the legitimate traffic, changing the
source port in each packet to encode the leaking data. In this
instance, the encoded delta is between the legitimate packet
and the modified packet, as opposed to the delta between two
modified packets. This approach has some advantages. First,
legitimate traffic will not have any effect on the channel;
whatever ephemeral source port is selected, the modified
duplicate packet will be able to use whatever port it needs for
the encoding as it will not actually open the socket advertised
locally. Similarly, there is no need to worry about
TIME_WAIT status of the sockets because the socket is never
actually opened. Finally, this approach will allow a much
higher bandwidth in a TCP environment as it will not need to
establish a connection for each delta. The primary
disadvantage to this technique is that it dissolves the features
that make source port delta channels appealing from the
perspective of covertness. There would be a high amount of
unusual traffic over the network, making it easy to tell that
some sort of communication is going on. Further, the new
packets are exact duplicated of legitimate traffic except for the
source port, making it easy for an analyst to identify the
source ports as suspicious and possibly leading to the
discovery of the transmitted data.
Another promising method involves using destination
ports in UDP as a way to transmit data. On many UDP
protocols, when a server receives a connection from a client it
replies back with a new port listed for this particular client to
use. This method allows UDP protocols to keep track of
different “connections” without the benefit of TCP
connectivity facilities. However, there is no limit to this port
switching technique and it may be feasible to leverage rapid
port switching deltas as a covert channel. There would be
some distinct advantages to this method, including that the
channel would survive NAT and proxy interference. Further,
since the role of the sender and receiver is swapped, this
method shows promise as a medium for covert command and
control. A disadvantage associated with this method is that it
would be inherently lossy.
Detection of this channel has yet to be researched. One
approach could be comparing the rapidly changing port
numbers to ordinary network traffic patterns. It may be
possible to identify or prevent this channel by noting source
port selection outside a standard variance.
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